impossible to get at the truth regarding the famine in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Yet the past few years have witnessed the publlcation of a considerable amount of material about both the new and the old Russia, and this; coupled with the [act that it is now just twenty years since the revolution bf 1917 took place, justifies an attempt to chart its course and estimate its meanipg.
At two o'clock on the morning of November 8, 1917 (October 26 by the then Russian calendar) hence the uOctober" Revolution), the Bolshevist forces poured like a tide in to the Win ter Palace in Petrograd, the seat of tl}e provisional republican ' government headed by I(erensky, and arrested the members of the cabinet. They had already seized the railway stations, the postal, telegraph) and telephone offices, and the state bank. They held the great fortress of Peter and Paul, and ,had a cruiser stationed on the Neva ready to bombard the 35 Winter Palace if necessary. But the government was defenceless. Its leader, Kerensky, had departed hours before to bring troops to save the capital-and did not" return. It had no ' option but to surrender. On the evening of the same day, Lenin appeared before the' tumultuous Congress of Soviets, which had just' assembled, and announced, "We shall now proceed 'to , construct the Socialist Order." The Bolshevist seizure of Petrograd, though sudden, was not unheralded. Under the grinding pressure of the War, the Tsarist regime had swiftly dissolved, meltiI:Jg away like that great ice palace Alexander I had once buil t on the Neva to en tertain his foreign gues ts. The abdication of Nicholas II, in March, 1917 , gave formal recognition to the dissolution, and was followed by a p eriod of seven-and-a-half mon ths marked above all by a "lack of governance." There was acute party strife, continuous political crisis, and a succession of provisional governments, the latest of them headed by Kerensky. The attempt by Kornilov to en d t he confusion by the establishment of a military dictatorship failed, and by its failure hastened the victory of Bolshevism. There were days of demonstration, agitations, attempts at insurrection, 'growing d isorders in the factories in and , , about the capital. The peasantry began to seize by force the land for which they hungered, The army began to disintegra te, ,and as pri ces l"Dse and food became scarcer the cry of "peace and bread" became stronger. Sukhanov, whom Trotsky dismisses as "a democratic p olitician of a socialist colouring," gives in his Memoirs a graphic summary of the growing anarchy:
Lynchings, breaking into houses and shops, acts o f violence against officers, provincial authorities, private persons, arbitrary arrests) seizures and acts of vengeance were registered daily in dozens and 36 THE RUSSIAN. ·REVOLUTION, 1917 ·REVOLUTION, -1937 hundreds. Burnings and lootings of manor houses increased in the villages. There were not a few excesses amongst the workers against the factory administrators, owners, and foremen . . . . Masses .of deserters appeared in 'the rear and at the front. Soldiers, without any pennission, poured homewards in enormous floods .
. They -filled up all the trains,' attacking the o'fficials, throwing out passengers. . .. And in the cities they overcrowded and destroyed the street-cars and boulevards, filled up all public places. There also one heard of drunkenness and dlso~del·.
Itwas th~ great-and growing confusion, approaching to chaos, which gave the Bolshevists their opportuni ty. Trotsky had returned from An1erica in May; Lenin, from .' Swi tzerland) in the famous sealed car across Germany, in September. We cannot say that the success of thelr attempt at revolution was inevitable. Trotsky himself . declares that "if the Bolshevists had not seized the power in October and November) in all.probability they would not have seized it at all."l But in the prevailing confusion) the Petrograd Soviet) with Trotsky as presi...; dent, and urged on by Lenin (then in hiding from arrest), made' a bid for power. In two days) almost \vithout figh tlng, they succeeded in gaining con trol of the capital. That was) of course, the beginning rather than the end. Indeed, we should hesi tate to say that the Russian Revolution has ended yet. Trotsky, in his latest book, There is an obvious parallel be tween the. se stages and those followed by the "bourgeois" French Revolution of 1789. There, too, the revolution began with a period (stage one) of social and poli tical reform (1789-92), ending with the overthrow of the m onarchy, the setting up of provision.al republican government, the increasingly violen t struggle between par ties for control, and the ultimate triumph of the Jacobins (as of the Bol shevists in Russia). There ensued (stage two) several years of foreign and civil war, in which the new regime was ultimately successful , and of experiment in political, social, and religious policy, which was less successful. These years from 1792 to the death of Robespierre ' (Thermidor, 1794) correspond to the years 1917-21 in Russia. I n both cases th ere followe d a turn to a more moderate regime, that of the Directory in France, that . of the New Economic Policy in Russia . In France this proved the prelude to the dictatorship of Napoleon as leader of the army, in Russia to the dictatorship of Stalin as leader of the Communist party. Adequately to carry through this parallel would require at least an 38 article in itself. But the parallel is there) and no emphasis on the differences between C/bourgeois )1 and "proletarian" 'revolutions destroys it. And the paraJlel has its value in tracing ,the course of the Russian Revolution from November, 19I7, onwards, to which we must n.ow turn.
II
The period I917-21 was) of course, in some 'ways the. most decisive one, for it saw Bolshevism overcome its enem.ies within the country, and make terms with those without. (In the case of France' the foreign war con~ tinued in part, which helps. to account for the fact that the army ultimately took over the revolution.) Russia has (or rather had) two capi tal ci ties, and after winning Petrograd it was vital for the Bolshevists to gain control of Moscow. This they accomplished after a' week's heavy fighting) and by the close of 1917 they were masters' of northern and central Russia, the heart and strategic centre of the country, with control of the existing railway communications.. They had the support of the majority of the town workers, the peasants} and the soldiers and sailors: the peasan ts wan ted the land, the soldiers wan ted peace. Against them were their rivals the Menshevists~ many of the Social Revolutionaries, the bourgeoisie, the' landlords, army officers, monarchists) and conservatives. The Cossack country of the south) especially round the Don, provided a natural centre for the opposition forces, and' to the standard raised there by Kaledin The struggle which distracted Russia during th ese years' was mu ch more complicated than the foregoing would suggest. W e may omit reference to the conflict in the remoter parts of the former Ru ssian Empire, in T ranscaucasia and Cen tral Asia, but the threat from Siberia was at one time quite serious, since Kolchak, who h ad set up a dictatorship at Omsk in November, I9I8, threatened the line of the Volga in the spring of I 9I9. The ti de turned, however, in the summer of that year, and Kolchak was "liquidated" in February, I920. The most urgen t and serious war-issue faced by the Bolshevists when they seized power was, however, the war with Germany . They owed their victory in P etrograd in no small measure to their support of the demand for immediate peace. But Germany, already successful on the weaker eas tern front, put forward the harshest terms. There was a severe internal struggle wi thin the new government, until in the end iliey gave way; they had . indeed little option. The resultant treaty of Brest Litovsk cut off most of the western borderlands, from Finla~d' southwards, and even, for a time, the vastly more important Ukraine. Not until after the Germ an defeat in the wes t, followed by the revolution in Germany 40 itself, was the Ukraine open first to anarchy (e.g., Makhno in 1919) and then to incorporation in Soviet Russia. ,Had not the Allies defeated Germany, the fate of the revolution and the civil war, not leas t in theUkraine, would have been very different. ' To that extent the four western allies aided the Bolshevists. At the same time, however, we find them interfering ac'tively and 'directly against the Bolshevists, at first as part of the general conflict with the Central Powers, but later in antagonism to the new regime, which was 'equally antagonistic to them, with ,its annulment of the Tsarist foreign debts and its anti-imperialist, an ticapitalist propaganda. The allied interven tion, whether in the ,Baltic, the White Sea, the south-east, or Siberia, slowed up but did not prevent the Bolshevist victory. Undoubtedly it aided the Baltic republics to secure their independenc~, and checked Bolshevist efforts to stir up revolution in western and central Europe. But it in-' evitably left behind a legacy of enmity, and this was fostered by the activities of the Third International.
' -By the end of 1920, indeed before, the Bolshevists had secured control of Russia. It was at great cost. Soviet Russia emerged shrunken by the loss of the fruits of-two hundred years of expansion along' its western borders~ The civil war, coming on top of the enormously expensive conRict with Germany and Austria, made havoc of the economic life of the country. I t was little wonder that famine, epidemic before, reached major proportions in 1921, when millions perished despite foreign efforts at relief. Terrorism and savagery flourished on both sides . during ,the civil war. The Bolshevists, like the J acobins, used the Red Terror to destroy their enemies, avowedly and systelnatically. The Cheka was the chief agen t, and it is estimated by a careful observer, Chamberlin, that "about fifty thousand persons were put to death in the course of the Red Terror during the period of the Civil War.'" The Whites, partly in revenge, were no more merciful to the Bolshevists they captured. R ussia appeared by the close of the war to be sinking back in to savagery.
Te~rorism and war did not absorb the whole of Bolshevist activities during this period. In government the outs tanding feature was the concentration of all authority in the hands 'of the Council of People's Commissars, with the Communist party behind it. Other parties or groups) as the Social Revolutionaries and the Menshevists, were "liquidated." The Constituent Assembly called by the provisional government was dismissed after one meeting (in J anuary, 1918) . And although the Fifth Congress of Soviets in July, 1918, adopted a Constitution which declared (article' one) that "all central and local authority belongs to the Soviets," in fact, under the pressure of the war, control was centralized in the hands of Lenin and his associates. The Communist party, reorganized and disciplined as far as possible, controlled the ' soviets and the trade-unions through its local "cells," and in general acted as the spearhead of the revolu tion.
In fulfilment of the pledge "to construc t the Socialist Order," the Bolshevists immediately after the seizu re of the capital passed a number of decrees of the most sweeping character. They declared the lan d and the banks national property, nationalized foreign trade and shipping, annulled the vast foreign debts of Russia, set up a supreme economic council with power to confiscate capitalistic enterprises, separated the church from the state, changed the marriage and divorce laws, and d 7 -elared world revolution to be the aim of the new government. Although some of these early decrees were declaratory rather than practical, the policy of nationalization and centralized state control was continued during the next few years . Under this "War Communism" the production of raw materials, manufacture large and small, trade, the railways, private property of all kinds, the distribution of food, all passed in to the hands of the new Soviet state. A u niversal obligation to work became a fundamental of the ' new order: "He shall not eat who does not work." T he attempt was made to abolish a money economy, and to substitute a "natural" economy, in which all transactions were made in kind.
In contrast with their success in the war, however, the Bolshevis ts failed in their policy of "War Communism." The system was put into effect under enormous difficulties, caused by the general exhaustion and economic dislocation, and the strain of the war. The railways, for example, were in a lamentable condition. On top of this came a torrent of hasty legislation, the sweeping away of what trained direction and management there was, and 'excessive centralization. There was a general spiri t of indiscipline, and financial chaos. There had been mismanagement and corruption in the old Russia'; they were not eliminated now.
The general result was calamitous. Manufacture declined in 19"0 to 13 per cent. of its volume in 19 13. Most ' serious, however, was the discontent of the peasantry. They had been given the "use" of the land, to t ill for themselves, but not for their own advantage. Their markets had disappeared, their live-stock was greatly reduced, and now the new government proceeded to take away from them their surplus products, which it needed for the starving cities, and even, for a time, to tax them. Discontent grew and production fell, despite the efforts of Trotsky to regiment agricultural production, and there were peasant risings in certain of the provinces. The winter of 1920-1 was the hungriest in Russia for many years. The final blow was the sudden mutiny of the sailors in Kronstadt, the former stronghold of Bolshevism, against the dictatorship of the Communist party, demanding free soviets, and greater equality and freedom. The rising was bloodily suppressed, but it brought matters to a head: War Communism had proved a failure, and Lenin made what he admitted was a "strategic retreat," to the N.E.P.
III
The period of the New Economic Policy lasted from 1921 to 1928, and was marked by compromise in the economic field, and later by the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin for the succession to Lenin. In its compromise quality, and also in the struggle between personalities for control of the revolution, it corresponds to the years 1794-9, when the Thermidorian reaction crystallized into the Directory, and Barras fought with his fellow directors for power. The main feature of the new policy in Russia was the abolition of the requisitioning of the surplus produce of the peasan ts. Instead, the peasan t paid a tax, at first in kind, then in money, after which he was free to dispose of his surplus as he wished . With this concession came also the abolition of the compulsory labour and labour army schemes, the restoration of a regular currency and internal stabiliza tion of the rouble, greater freedom of managemen t in industry, limited freedom of private trade and even of small industry, the invitation to . foreign capital to enter Russia. Private shops were allowed to open.
There is no doubt that the N.E.P. was strategically sound. There was a marked economic recovery, aided by better harvests in 1922 and 1923, as by the fact that · the war was over. True, there was a great increase in the number of independen t farmers, the ·kulaks and the "Nepmen" flourished, but Lenin was justified in his view that the concessions to capitalism were not large enough seriously to endanger the Communist control over Russia. It was, he argued, state capitalism, and not dangerous. But Lenin did no t live to see the later development of the N.E.P., and we do not know what policy he would have pursued had he lived. Incapaci tated by a stroke in 1922, he died in January, 1924. and immediately there began the epic can test for the success ion between Stalin and Trotsky. This post-Thermidorian rivalry was in p art a struggle for power between rivals, in part a conflict of ideals. Trotsky stood for the uncompromising effort towards world revolution; Stalin was concerned with the. success of the revollltion in the U.S.S.R., "'Socialism within a single country." Trotsky was the more brilliant publicist; . Stalin, the shrewder politician. Both laid claim to the mantle of Lenin, but Stalin had made better preparations for his succession. As secretary-general of 45 the Commun ist party he had greater con trol over the p. arty. As successor to Lenin in the chairmanship of the all-important polilburo (chief sub-committee of the central committee of the party) he organized victory for himself and crushed the "left deviation," represen ted by Trotsky and his ad herents. In 1927 Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev we~e expelled from the Communist party, and although the two former recanted Trotsky was recalcitrant) and in 19:29 was deported, to ·begin the long Odyssey from Turkey to Mexico. Presumably Stalin hesitated to confer on his powerful opponent the crown of martyrdom-a hesitation he must since have regretted.
IV
Stalin's victory over Trotsky ushered in the fourth st age of the revolution, reaching from 1928 to the present time. It has been m arked by the tu rn from the N.E.P.
to the Five-Year Plans, attempting to establish "socialism within a single country." At first sight, the parallel with the French R evolution breaks down here, for Stali n was neither a newcomer nor has he been a conquering general, like N apoleon after Brumaire. But dictatorship was characte" ris tic of both regimes, and N apoleon was a great legislator as welL as a ' soldier, and claimed, like Stalin, to be fulfilling the revolution . Whether the new Ru ssian constitution offers any parallel to Napoleon 's constitution of 1815, his Acle additionnel,' it is too soon to say.
The first Five-Year Pl an drawn up by Gosplan, the State Planning Commission (though Trotsky declares his. Own Left Opposition were the real authors of the plan), affected both industry and agriculture. , For the former the plan envisaged a vast expansion by the state of the 46 supply of raw materials, the provision of hydro-electric power) of new railways) of manufactured goods) particularly in "heavy" industry. I t mean t the end of the N.E.P. concessions to private initiative. For "agriculture, where by 1928 there were some twenty-six million small holdings) with over ninety-five per cent. of the land in private holdings, the plan implied the liquidation of the better-off peasan ts) the kulaks) and the general substitution for private holdings of e~thel' state farming or licollective" agriculture." This liquidation was carried out in the years after 1929, and in" the most ruthless fashion. I t succeeded) but at the cost of the serious reduc tion of the live-stock of the coun try, a shortage of wheat, and famine "in the Ukraine and the Caucasus, in which several miUions perished. The state farms were hardly successful; but the drive for the collectives wen t on steadily, until most of rural Russia was so organized. In the normal type of collective the land is held and cnl tivated" collectively, under a board. The yield of the farm is divided between seed and the needs of maintenance, 'developmen t, and social services j wha t remains is divided amongst the members. As defined and regulated by the new constitution of 1936 the "system aJJows for individual tenure of garden plots, wi th some individually owned live-stock. Aided by good harvests, the system has undoubtedly aided production. It is not entirely free-the members can scarcely withdraw-and it does not eliminate inequalities.
Yet looking at the land problem, the major problem of Tsarist Russia, as a whole, it is clear that the revolution has ended the old ""system: there are no longer any privately owned large estates. The peasant has the land "for eternal use," not individually' it is true, but in rural communi ties" not wholly" dissimilar to the old village 47 cornniunltles. He has also his "midget farm" for food, save bread and fodder. With the large-scale production of the collectives the way is open to "greatly improved agricultural methods. Thus it may be that economically the land problem in Russia is solved; the problem of the organization of rural society is another matter. Already inequalities have appeared, and some stratification in to richer and po"c"rer seems bound to develop. The governmen t's prosecutions of officials in the summer of 1937 as ucrop-wreckers,", together with the new concessions made by Stalin to the peasants," suggest that rural Russia may be Jess satisfied and peaceful than the foregoing bare summary might imply."
On the industrial side the first Five-Year Plan (followed by a second for" 1933-7) was marked both by success and shortcomings. "Wi th "the aid of foreign capi tal and direction thel"e was unquestionably a great increase in the output of "industry. " Stalln"in his Report to the Seventeen th Congress of the Communist party" (1934) claimed that whereas in 19I 3 Russian production was fifty-eight per cent. agricultural and forty-two per" cen t. indus trial J .in r 933 it was seven ty per cent. industrial. "This means," he declared, "that our coun try has firmly and finally become "an industrial country." It is to be remembered that Russia in I917) like the United States after her Civil War, had enormous natural resources waiting to be developed. Stalin also claimed that Russian jndustry had C<succeeded in this same period in tratning and forging thous~nds of new men and women) of new leaders in industry, a whole new stratum of new engi~eers and technicians," Here no doub't he was over-. ! optimistic. The time was too short for so considerable a task, and there was, in fact) much loss and wastage in industry. Despi te the great efforts put forth, the final 4B achievements of the first Plan were less complete than earlier estimates 6f its success indicated. And the concentration on heavy industry was achieved partly at the expense of "consumers' goods," the production of which lagged far behind the growing demand. Ye t the achievement was sufficiently rema,·kable, as Stalingrad, Magnitogorsk, and Dniepostroy show, and · the progress has been con tinued during the second FiveYear Plan, in the production of raw materials and metals, in heavy industry, in communications (canals and railways), in the technical equipment of the army, and even in consumers' goods. Housing is lamen tably behind, but that is partly due to the general increase in demand. Here, as elsewhere, the . comparison must be wi th the Tsarist regime, and there is no question but that Russian industry has developed remarkably since 1914, and that the condi tion of the greatly increased army of industrial workers is vastly improved. It is quite impossible in a · brief sketch like this to go into details either of industrial organ ization or of wages, prices, etc. For these the reader may be referred to the comprehensive account of the Webbs, Soviet. Communism . Since 1928 wages have . greatly increased, and in addition to wages proper, the Russian wor· kman recei·ves many social benefits not necessarily included elsewhere; so that the condition of the industrial worker in Russia, if not yet equal to that of his fellow in Scandinavia, Britain, Canada, or the United States, is far better than it was under the old regime . Thus, measured in terms of the material .welfare of the industrial worker, the revolu tion has accomplished · a good deal. No doubt production would have increased, and conditions improved, under any form of government conceivable in Russia during the past twenty years. The Bolshevis t revolu tion , at a price, accelerated the 49 process) and carried it further, in all probability, than it would have-_ been carried under another regime in ' the same time. Here again) aided by the change to pay'men t of wages by piece work in 1934) inequalities have developed, and something resembling a petty bourgeoisie seems to be emerging. Indeed it has already emerged as a result of the vast development of bureaucracy, which creates another link between the new and the old Russia.
v So far we have been concerned with the Bolshevist seizure of power, the defeat of its enemies, and the attempt to build up an agrarian and industrial system which would conform to Marxian-Leninist views as in terpreted by Stalin and his aSsoclates. Bu t that is, of cours~, far from the whole story. The Bolshevists righ tly saw that if their revolu tion was to succeed the peoples of the U.S.S.R. must be educated, and educated in the new faith. Il~ 19I7 the vast m'ajority of the one hundred and seven ty million people of the old Eurasian Empire ,(Stepun) in The Rus.rian Soul and Revolution, says eighty per-cent.) were illiterate peasants. Their westernization had begun) but, speaking generally, hardly more than begun. Largely through the agency of the Communist party) the spearhead of the revolution, their education was now carried on wi th a zest -and energy which Peter the Great, the initiator of westernization [or Russia, would perforce have admired. -Efforts were concentrated on the younger generation) and cinema and radio, factory and school, membership of the Comsomol) of the soviets, the trade-unions and the co11ective farms, all contributed to this e'nd. And the whole process of education, a gigan tic task in a realm in which -over one hundred. languages are spoken} has been utilized in 50 building up the belief that Russian Communism (as defined by authorlty) is the best form of social and economic organization. Since Communlsm and Science contain all that is necessary for human welfare and happiness, there was no need for a Christian God· or a Christian Church~ hence a policy of Han ti-godism'~ alternating with "sceptical neutrality"-though there· is a .
call at the monien t for Hbroader an ti-religious work," whatever that may imply, to meet an unexpected revival . of religion .
. The Bolshevist revolution did not develop in a vacuum. Both its early days and its later history were profoundly aflected by external condi tions. . The legacy of foreign antagonism, fruit in large measure of the avowed policy of world revolu tion and the connection of the ne\v regime with the Third International, inevitably prejudiced the foreigtl relations of the Soviet Union. But the obvious need for peace to develop "socialism within a single coun try," and the need also for foreign trade and foreign capi tal, induced Stalin to adopt a less bellicose attitude to the outside world. The advent of Naziism in Gerlnany· and the more aggressive pohcy of Japan in Asia, culminating in the German-Japanese alliance, both further encouraged friendly rela tions with other powers) as· seen in the en try in to the League. of Nations and the recent treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, and encouraged nationalism wi thin the U.S.S.R. itself. The Soviet State, far from Hwithering away" as the earlier Bolshevist theory prophesied, became the embodiment of a nationalism hardly distinguishable from bourgeois na tionalism; Communism became not merely compatible with patriotism, but its arden t supporter. The Red Army was enlarged and fostered; the officers'· corps was restored; discipline was stiffened up, and con-51 scription was included in the new consti tutian . "Counterrevolu tion ary activity" was nO longer a domestic affair~ but (as the recent trials show) w~s bound up with the threat of foreign invasion.
The growth of nationalism in Soviet Russia is of interest in a broader way. The Webbs end their comprehensive survey of the Soviet system by arguing that the Bolshevists have indeed created a new civilization. That depends on one's definition of civilization, and to the writer the claim seems absurdly excessive. All the elements of the Soviet system originated within western civilization) and not merely in its nationalism, but in other developments, the Soviet regime has recently appeared to be gravitating towards liberal-democratic western views, and so towards the Liberal tradition of . pre-revolutionary Russia. This trend is evidenced in Soviet legislation of the past three years dealing with many. aspects of national life. The concession · to the .peasant's desire to have some property of his own has been mentioned already. In religion persecu tion was mOre specifically disavowed, and the new constitution guaran tees (art . . 124) "freedom of religious worship" to all. The educational system has been radically changeil: the need for greater discipline in tlle schools is recognized, examinations (abolished in 1917) have been restored, academic titles revlved, classical studies re-introduced, and restrictio ns to entrance to the universities on account of birth or origin abolished. The family has become more important again, as the changes 'in t·he divorce laws and the abolition of abortion (1936) show.
VI
The most outstanding evidence of the recent trend in Russia, however," 18 provided by the new constitution, promised in 1935, published in June, 1936, and adopted (with minor modifications) by -the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in D~cember, 1936 . This lengthy and interesting document, which cannot be here sum-. marized, does not change the general' character of the organization of the U.S.S.R., which remains a federation, "a socialist state of workers and peasan ts" (art. I),' In which {{all power belong's to the toilers of city and village as represented by the soviets of toilers' deputies" (art. 3).
Association of the various republics in the U.S.S.R. is declared to be voluntary (art. 17). The liberal-delnoera tic tendency is shown in the system of election to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., the federal legislature. All men and women have the vote "irrespective of racial and national affiliation, religion, educational status) social origin~ property status or past activities." The suffrage is henceforth to be direct, and th~ secret ballot is included (arts. I34-5). Further, by articles 125 and 127 in the sec tion en ti tled tlFundamen tal Righ ts and Duties of Citizens H (which ren1ind.s us of bourgeois France in 1789, and _ bourgeois Germany 'in 1848 and I919) all citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of meeting and organization, and inviolability of person. I-Iere, it is worth noting,' occurs the sale men tion in the consti tu tion of th~ Commun1st party, as llthe vanguard of the toilers."" We need not follow the details of' the organization -of federal and union-republican legislative, executive, and judicial , powers, which conform in general to those of other federal democratic states, save that the economic functlons of the componen t pal~ts of this socialis t state are necessarily larger: the federal authority deals with heavy industry, the Union Republics wi th food, light industry, agricul ture) timber, .and Ii ve-s tock.
T his constitution has been claimed by Stali n to be uthe most democratic in the world/' and Krilenko describes it as "the great Stalin consti tution in which are embodied the greatest achievemen ts of socialism in every sphere of life ; political, economic, cul tural, and social. " T ro tsky in his latest attack on Stalin (The Revolutio11 Betrayed) declares that it is nOt truly democratic, since it was prepared "secretl y" and the people were not free to criticize it. 'His main charge against the new consti tu tion, however) is that it is nei ther socialis t nor communist, but a betraya l of the revolution to "bourgeois democracy." The wes tern adheren t of U bourgeois democracy," unless he is a political theorist concerned with the difficult task or exactly defi ning "socialism" and "communism" will be less concerned with this criticism .
R ecognizing what, to him, are the undoubted merits of the constitu tion, he will be more inclined to ask, Will it work? J n particular, can this newer freedom be reconciled wi th the all-embracing control exercised by Stalin, the politburo and the Communist p arty . " 1 doub t," says Gide in his recent criticism of the U.S.S.R ., "whether in any country in the world, even in Hi tler's Germany, though t is less free than in Soviet Russia." Yet if the new national parliament is to be more th an a Nazi R eichstag, if the other privileges enshrined in the ncw consti tu tion are to have any real meaning, there must be a real change in the whole spiri t and nature of the govern men t of the Soviet Union.
"Peaceful change" of a radical kind is difficult, if not dangerous, in in cernal as in in cernati'onal affairs. ~'Life has become better, Comrades; life has become more j oyous," said Stalin in 1936 . Yet in August of that year there occurred the extraordinary trials of the old Bolshevists Zinoviev, Kamen ev~ and over a dozen others, who were condemned and shot; and in· January, 1937, came the trial of Radek the Soviet publicist, and sixteen others, who were also condemned, th.ough not all of .them to death. All the accused in both trials had pleaded guilty to treason or plots of an almost fan tastlc nature) wi th Trotsky as the arch-conspira tOt. These trials convey to the Qutside observer less of joyousness than of suspicion and ru thless repression, bred of fear) on the part of the Soviet governmen t, and, on the side of the accused) of a psychology scarcely found outside the pages. of Dostoievsky. During the spring and early summer of this year these trials have been followed by' arrests and executions involving Communist and non-Communlst officials of every class and occirpation) from White Rus~ia to Siberia, on charges orsabotage in industry, spyi-ng for foreign powers, Trotskyism) crop-wrecking, persecution _ of the peasants, etc. Some of the makers of the new constitution have already disappeared. The sacred Red Army has been invo]ved, with the demand for its· '~re communization/' and the elimination of such outstanding leaders as Tukachevsky. Nor can we be sure that this new purge is yet over.
I t may be that these trials, arrests, and disappearances, ahd the impression they create outside Russia, _ have little to do with the mass of the people of the U.S.S.R. They do not ~ffect the unquestioned improvement in material conditions resulting from the revolution; nor do they necessarily portend any very serious threat to the existing regime. Bu t they illustrate the difficul ty of delivering judgment either on the future of the revolution or, more immediately, ·on the probability of the success of the new constitution. Indeed, we are almost driven back to that remark of the seventeenth-century traveller with which this -article opened, or to that other remark, this time by a Russian, that "things that do not happen, occur in Russia."
